the deceased's bedridden husband (Mr Loh) was in his bedroom. Initially, the prosecution, on the basis of Ismil's statements to the police made a day after he was arrested, argued that he was the sole assailant. The prosecution did not think that Muhammad was involved in the actual murder, but argued that as he was also present at the scene of the crime, he shared a common intention with Ismil under s 34 of the Penal Code. 5 However, Muhammad later claimed that he was the sole assailant. The prosecution then argued that Muhammad alone had inflicted the fatal wounds, but maintained the brothers were equally liable for murder pursuant to s 34. The brothers were convicted by the High Court to suffer capital punishment, though the identity of the actual assailant remained unascertained. 6 On appeal, the prosecution argued that only Muhammad should be found guilty for murder, while Ismil should be found guilty of committing robbery with hurt. The prosecution chose to rely on to Ismil's early statements in which he had claimed to be the sole assailant, despite his subsequently invoking an alibi. The CA dismissed Muhammad's appeal but set aside Ismil's conviction, declaring he had not been proven guilty of any offence. This was in part due to 'the complete absence' of evidence to 'establish that Ismil was present at the flat'. 7 The court added that it was deeply troubled by the fact that the prosecution only provided certain vital pieces of evidence to the defence in phases and very late in the proceedings. 8 Specifically, the prosecution failed to disclose several statements made by Mr Loh wherein he had 'clearly', 'consistently', and 'unambiguously' stated that he only saw one intruder in the flat and even gave a 'detailed description' of the intruder. 9 The prosecution maintained that any obligation to disclose was purely ethical in nature. 10 The prosecution further gave three reasons as to why the statements were initially withheld: (a) they believed Mr Loh's statements were neither credible (given the difficulties he had in expressing himself) nor relevant; (b) during an identification parade, he was unable to identify the intruder even though Muhammad and Ismil were in the line-up; and (c) at no point was he deemed 'sufficiently fit' to clarify his evidence.
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Despite these arguments, the court strongly criticised the prosecution's conduct of the case. The court was cognisant of the existing local statutory requirements that is likely to be inadmissible, but would provide a real (not fanciful) chance of pursuing a line of inquiry that leads to material that is likely to be admissible and that might reasonably be regarded as credible and relevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused.
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c AnAlysIs of the court's reAsonIng
CPC and CPC 2010
The CA surveyed the law to see if there was a legal obligation for the prosecution to disclose evidence like Mr Loh's statements, which the court categorised as 'unused material', or 'material in the possession of the prosecution which will not be relied on at trial'. 13 By way of background, the primary legislation that governs criminal proceedings in Singapore is the Criminal Procedure Code. There are two versions: the older version (CPC), 14 which for the most part applies to prosecutions commenced before January 2011, and the current version (CPC 2010), 15 which applies to prosecutions commenced during or after January 2011. The prosecution of Muhammad and Ismil commenced in 2005.
The CA first noted that neither the CPC nor CPC 2010 expressly compels the prosecution to disclose any kind of unused material, such as statements made by an accused that the prosecution have no intention of relying on at trial, or documents revealing the existence and identities of persons who have information about the case but who will not be called as prosecution witnesses. 16 The court then referred to Selvarajan James v Public Prosecutor, 17 where an accused had asked for an order compelling the prosecution to produce a statement by his accomplice that could have exculpated him. It was held there that there was no statutory obligation for the prosecution to disclose the statement as the prosecution was not 12 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [ going to rely on it; moreover, it was for Parliament and not the court to introduce such an obligation into the CPC. 18 However, the CA pointed out that unlike s 6 of CPC 2010, 19 s 5 of the CPC 20 imposes a mandatory application of English law where the CPC is silent. 21 It thus concluded that Selvarajan does not preclude Singapore courts from following 'authorities and principles relating to the common law of prosecutorial disclosure . . . in England and adopted in other mature common law jurisdictions'. 22 The court then proceeded with a survey of various jurisdictions, beginning, as it had to by virtue of the language of s 5 of the CPC, with England. It is at this point that some seeds of confusion were sown that began to sprout later on.
Reference to English cases decided before the CPIA
Regarding England, the CA observed that before the introduction of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (CPIA), cases were intricate, complex, difficult, and potentially required the prosecution to 'disclose masses of material of only speculative relevance'. 23 Parenthetically, two points are worth noting here. Firstly, the CPIA 'was designed to alleviate the burdens of disclosure perceived to lie upon the police and prosecution under the old law, which it was felt were being exploited by those accused of crime'. 24 Second, English cases prior to the CPIA are generally no longer considered when determining the English position on the prosecutor's duty of disclosure. 25 Despite recognising that most of the principles gleaned from the English cases (including those decided pursuant to the CPIA) are largely incompatible with the CPC and CPC 2010 (and thus are inapplicable), 26 the CA said that the general principle that can be distilled from the English cases-the importance of achieving 'a just outcome by means of a fair trial'-is 'highly instructive'. 27 A principle framed in such a broad level of abstraction is of limited utility in and of itself, but the court went on to state that the 'English common law disclosure regime is consistent with the position prevailing in all the other common law jurisdictions that we have surveyed '. 28 Two problems follow from this statement.
First, it is unclear if the 'regime' refers exclusively to English cases decided before the CPIA was in effect. If so, then it is hard to see the point of surveying the cases of other jurisdictions that are consistent with a regime that the court had already declared to be largely incompatible with the CPC and CPC 2010-the logical upshot must be that all of the non-English cases are also largely incompatible with the CPC and CPC 2010. If, on the other hand, the 'regime' includes cases decided pursuant to the CPIA, it is hard to see how that regime can readily accommodate cases sitting on opposite sides of the fence that effectively cancel each other out when read together, given that the CPIA was intended to be a new regime that remedies the flaws developed by the jurisprudence prior to the CPIA's inception. Indeed, the CPIA was meant to 'limit the extent to which the defence could burden the prosecutor with requests for further information without indicating what they hoped to find'. 29 Flowing from this, it is curious that the CA's distillation of the principles of the 'regime' was predicated on cases arising both before and after the inception of the CPIA. 30 Of course, one may take the view that the court's analysis weaved together two distinct issues, that is, whether, under s 5 of the CPC, English law for the time being in force ought to be imported into Singapore, and whether, under s 6 of CPC 2010, disclosure rules ought to be fashioned for Singapore 'as the justice of the case may require'. 31 On that view, broad principles of fairness may be relevant to the latter issue, but then the statutory provision in question in Muhammad bin Kadar was s 5, and not s 6, and the disclosure test proposed by the CA was a common law one, and not a statutory one. 32 For these reasons, the CA's resort to English cases and the principles developed therein is questionable, or at least, it has created some uncertainty by failing to explain how and what in those cases applied.
Commonwealth cases: the relevance-good faith distinction, and the problem of admissibility
Assuming one can surmount the obstacles mentioned above, there are still other obstacles in that the authorities surveyed in the other (non-English) jurisdictions do not fully provide the legal basis for the CA to conclude the way it did. Instead, those authorities essentially relate either to exhortations to the prosecution to be fair and accountable to the public and not to be overzealous in securing 28 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 1) [ convictions, or to the general legal obligation for the prosecution to disclose evidence that is material to any given issue of the case. 33 The former is not very problematic as it does not state anything over and above what must surely be trite propositions known to, and applied by, any self-respecting and credible prosecution. It is the latter that has the potential to cause confusion.
To elaborate, there are a couple of important differences that need to be appreciated at the outset. One, the difference between evidence that is deemed (be it by the prosecution or by the court) relevant/irrelevant or material/ immaterial, and evidence that is deemed (likewise, be it by the prosecution or by the court) reliable/unreliable. 34 Two, the difference between evidence that is being deliberately withheld out of bad faith, and evidence that is being withheld out of a good faith judgment. Admittedly, the concept of good faith can be elusive and difficult to define; for present purposes, however, a workable operative definition is that of honesty, absence of bad faith, and absence of any ulterior purpose. 35 The two differences are important because the prosecution in Muhammad bin Kadar categorically maintained that Mr Loh's statements were not disclosed early in the proceedings because it genuinely believed (in good faith) that the statements were non-credible or unreliable (as opposed to being irrelevant). 36 One would imagine that if the prosecution was telling the truth, then it seems, intuitively at least, hard to fault them for being unethical, even if a court is entitled to later adjudge that the statements are objectively relevant. The CA did not believe the prosecution, 37 which it was entitled to, but the authorities it cited and relied upon did not properly addresses the interplay between reliability, relevance, and good faith. It is apposite then, at this juncture, to turn to the illustrations that demonstrate the aforementioned second problem. The following list outlines the cases from the different jurisdictions (some of which even have legislation similar to the CPC 38 ) and accompanying principles (sans the exhortations) as identified by the CA:
(1) Australia: the prosecution 'may not suppress evidence in its possession . . . material to the contested issues in the trial. It must ordinarily provide such evidence to the defence.' 39 (2) Hong Kong: 'Non-disclosure to the defence of relevant material, even if not attributable to any breach by the prosecutor of his duty to disclose, can result in material irregularity and an unsafe conviction.' 40 (3) Canada: the purpose of a prosecution 'is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime'. 41 (4) India: the duty of the prosecution is to place before the court 'whatever evidence is in his possession, whether it be in favour or against the accused'. 42 (5) Malaysia: if the prosecution 'knows of a credible witness who can speak to material facts which tend to show the prisoner to be innocent, he must either call that witness himself or make his statement available to the defence'. 43 (6) Brunei: unless the prosecution has 'good reasons for withholding a statement', it cannot refuse to disclose it and make it available.
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As can be seen, there is nothing that properly addresses the said interplay between reliability, relevance, and good faith. The most recurring element is that of materiality, or relevance, though one can perhaps make the argument that reliability is somehow subsumed under relevance. 45 Further to that, one can argue that good faith can also be covered (albeit not completely) by the approach taken in Brunei, which uses the test of 'good reasons for withholding a statement', but as will be seen, the CA did not take the view that it is for the prosecution to decide if a piece of evidence is material and relevant. In any event, the CA directed both sets of counsel to make further submissions as to whether the prosecution was under any duty to the court to disclose to it material that was 'a) not part of the prosecution's case, b) from a seemingly credible source, c) that would be admissible in evidence and d) that may have a direct bearing on the guilt or innocence of an accused'. 46 This is interesting because as stated above, it is clear that the authorities cited by the court pertain emphatically to relevance and materiality (and thus do not quite address one of the cornerstones of the prosecution's argument), but in the directions it gave, the court also introduced the element of admissibility.
Admissibility has always been a tricky concept and particularly in Singapore, there has been a perennial and unresolved debate surrounding the exact relationship between logical relevance, legal relevance, admissibility, weight, ouclj vol 11 no 2 probative value, prejudice, and the like. 47 As an illustration, the Chief Justice (back when he was Attorney-General) once said that there is 'no need for a judge [in Singapore] to go through the formal process of declaring [a piece of ] evidence inadmissible', because 'the judge can simply give whatever weight is appropriate to the evidence'. 48 This statement was largely motivated by the fact that Singapore had long abolished the jury system and now relies entirely on trial judges to make findings of fact. The CA in Muhammad bin Kadar did briefly adopt a position with regard to admissibility, but it is submitted that there is much more to be clarifiedfor instance, the court says admissibility in the Singapore context refers to a 'minimum standard of credibility and materiality', but does not really explain why this should be the case. 49 Indeed, academics have maintained for decades that Singapore's Evidence Law was never drafted with a proper understanding of inter alia relevance and admissibility. 50 While it may be said that this was not the best occasion for the court to address that definitional and conceptual conundrum, insofar as admissibility clearly features as one of the elements in its proposed test for disclosure, that conundrum indeed had to be addressed. Without more, the CA's criticisms of the prosecution may be read as excessive.
Speaking past the prosecution?
Putting all of that aside, one of the submissions that the prosecution made in response to the direction for further submissions was that the aforementioned duty to the court was only ethical in nature. 51 It added that while this obligation was a continuing one, it (as the CA read it) retained the subjective prosecutorial discretion not to disclose, provided it acted bona fide and in consideration of the effect of other evidence available to it. 52 In other words, the prosecution was echoing its consistent and recurring position, that of acting in good faith when presenting only the most reliable and relevant evidence before the court. The CA's response was that first, if the duty was only ethical in nature, one would 'effectively sanction unscrupulous methods of prosecution with the court's stamp of approval '. 53 However, this is not necessarily the case and the CA appear to have conflated the two distinct issues of whether the duty of disclosure is legal in additional to being ethical and what the standard of disclosure (whether legal or ethical) should be. It justified the legal nature of the duty by referring to 'the general principles in the common law', 'parliamentary intention', and 'the wide scope of s 5 of the CPC'. 54 The court referred principally to one of the Law Minister's speeches concerning CPC 2010: 'If [prosecutors] deliberately suppress material evidence, they will be acting in gross breach of their duties.'
55 While the minister's statement indeed suggests some sort of duty (though it is not clear whether it is of an ethical or legal nature), it also alludes to some sort of good faith. It ought to be recalled that the court's eventual formulation of the duty sets the criteria as credibility and relevance, when there is authority to suggest that good/bad faith is just as important.
The CA's second response was that it is not for the prosecution to decide if a piece of evidence is credible and relevant, for only the courts have the power to enforce the duty. 56 Although this may be true, it is not immediately apparent how this answered the prosecution's argument. The prosecution argued that it should be adjudicated on the standard of subjective bona fides. The court was free to say the standard should be objective instead, but the prosecution did not go as far as to say that the court could not judge if the prosecution had acted bona fide. Moreover, one does wonder the practicality of 'where there is any doubt about whether a piece of unused evidence is credible, the court should be allowed to make the final decision'. 57 How does this actually translate into practice, given that complex prosecutions can involve many pieces and types of evidence?
It is perhaps unsurprising that a few weeks after the judgment, the AttorneyGeneral's Chambers sought clarification from the court regarding the exact scope of the duty to disclose, 58 to which the court maintained in a supplementary judgment (this being an extremely rare practice) that:
First, there was no attempt by this court . . . to comprehensively state the law on this issue. Second, "the duty of disclosure certainly does not cover all unused material or even all evidence inconsistent with the Prosecution's case". Third, our judgment . . . does not frame any duty in relation to the work of investigators and how they ought to interact with the Prosecution. That issue did not arise on the facts before us. Fourth, we referred to the duty imposed on the Prosecution as applying continuously to undisclosed material "in its possession", that is to say, within its knowledge.' . . to allow the Attorney-General more time to study the full impact of Kadar for the purposes of advising the government whether to legislatively amend its effect . . . prosecution also submitted that the continued viability of a great deal of investigative and prosecutorial practice turned on a definitive resolution of the doubts they had raised. Specifically, if prosecutors had a duty to search through everything the investigators gathered in the course of their work. . .' 59 Muhammad bin Kadar (n 59) [13] .
Might this be an indication that the court had, in its original judgment, based its strong reaction on the patent injustice suffered by Ismil?
d conclusIon
Muhammad bin Kadar has the hallmarks of a seminal judgment: it is lengthy, contains many (and many kinds of ) authorities, and addresses novel points of law. It is submitted, however, that a detailed examination of the legal reasoningspecifically the premise on which the duty to disclose unused material is grounded-reveals a series of questions as to whether the reasoning is logically defensible from the outset. The proposed test (based on relevance and credibility) appears to have conflated the two distinct issues of the nature of the duty to disclose and the standard of disclosure to be complied with (particularly the role of good faith of the prosecution). Indeed, while Ismil was probably rightly exonerated (on evidential grounds) of his conviction, one needs to be circumspect and fair in balancing the rights and responsibilities of both the prosecution and defence before criticising the prosecution for wrongly exercising its 'perceived unfettered discretion on disclosure' and for having failed in their ethical duty to the court.
